Learning through Conflict at Oxford by Jam es A. Throgm orton
Over the past 10-15 years, a d iverse m ix of planning and policy-related scholars have been claim ing that planning and the policy sciences have m ad e an argum entative, rhetorical, neo-pragm atic, or --m ore broad ly --com m unicative turn (see Forester, 1989; Forester and Fischer, 1993; H arper and Stein, 1995; H ealey, 1997; H och, 1994; Innes, 1995; Mand elbaum , Mazza, and Burchell, 1996;  and Throgm orton, 1996.) Jud y Innes m ad e the claim m ost d irectly w hen she argued in her 1995 paper that "a new type of [com m unicative] planning theorist is beginning to d om inate the field " (p. 183).
I think it is fair to say that a clear m ajority of the planning scholars w ho attend ed the Oxford conference on planning theory in April 1998 rejected Innes' strong claim . Most of the participants w anted to replace com m unicative theory w ith their ow n preferred theoretical approaches. Som e argued , for exam ple, that planning should be based on the principles of ecological sustainability. Others argued that it should be based on spatial processes and the regulation of space.
Still others prom oted a return to Rationality. And so on. In the end , the conference participants proffered such an array of theoretical approaches t hat resolution of d ifferences betw een them w ould require im posing one of them on all the others or else d evising a process w hich w ould enable them to engage one another constructively. Ironically, it is just this need to engage others constructively that has led to the increasing interest in com m unicative theory.
As best I could tell, the irony seem ed to escape m ost of the conference participants.
After Oxford , those w ho ad vocate a com m unicative approach to planning w ill continue to m ake their case, w hile those w ho reject that approach w ill continue to prom ote their ow n perspectives. I w ill not, therefore, try to present a com plete sum m ary of "w hat happened " at Oxford as if I w ere an unbiased reporter. Rather, let m e sim ply offer a few observations that m ight be of value to fellow com m unicative theorists and w hich m ight facilitate future d ialogues about planning theory. Com m unicative theorists should also clarify that not all of their w ork is rooted in H aberm asian com m unicative ethics. Much valuable w ork has d raw n on H aberm as (especially Forester, 1989) , and it should continue. But com m unicative theory has roots that spread w ell beyond the fertile soil of Jurgen H aberm as. From a rhetorical perspective, for exam ple, one m ight focus on the inherently contestable m eanings of key concepts, account for w ays in w hich aud iences and contexts shape com m unications, and analyze the flow of argum entation (i.e., claim ing, respond ing, and rebutting) w ithin specific co ntexts (see Crossw hite, 1996, and Throgm orton, 1996) . 2 hence is a com m unicative action. Why use that form of reply rather than, say a polite letter to their elected representatives in Congress? Perhaps because they believe the protest w ill be m ore persuasive. Persuasive to w hom ? The larger public. Or perhaps because they believe the protest w ill be constitutive; that is, help recruit new m em bers to the protesters' cause and hence strengthen their hand in later political conflicts. In either case, their response is a com m unicative action, or --from a rhetorical point of view --a persuasive and constitutive act.
